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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of:
Cache Valley Syndicate Trust

Case No. 15396

Successor to
Financial Service Co., Inc.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant disagrees with the Statement of Facts of
the respondent and most of these disagreements are set forth
in the Statement of Facts in the appellant's original Brief.
However, the respondent raises an additional issue in paragraph
two of his Statement of Facts when he alleges that the
appellant, Elmer Erickson, was determined to be criminally
culpable in causing losses to Cache Valley Syndicate Trust.
This is not an accurate statement of facts.

Elmer Erickson

entered a plea of guilty to three separate criminal complaints
entitled "The State of Utah vs. Elmer Erickson" File Nos.
18711, 18712 and 23004.

The first two complaints were issued

on the 29th day of August, 1972, and the third complaint was
issued on the 11th day of February, 1976.

Those three complaints
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alleged that Elmer Erickson obtained money from· ind 1· Vl'd ua],

·,

contrary to

state law.

1

Elmer Erickson was never charged

with taking money from Cache Valley Syndicate Trust or
any other illegal activity pertaining to Cache Valley Synd:l
cate Trust.

POINT 1
THE CLAIMS OF ELMER G. ERICKSON WERE NOT
BARRED BY ANY COURT ORDER OR PROBATION
AGREEMENT.
The appellant strenuously objects to the

respond~t

attempting to embellish the records in the lower court by
attaching to his Brief copies of court orders and probatic:
agreements from other criminal actions.

If the respondent

intended these matters to be considered by the court, then
he should have introduced them in the lower court and then
designated them as part of the record on appeal in accordawith Rule 75 A.

The respondent did not do so, and conseqt:j

said documents should not now be considered by the Suprero;
Court.
The respondent contends that the appellant 'is barred
from filing this appeal and supposedly from maintaini~~
action in the lower court for claims he has as a creditor
or as a beneficial interest holder.

This is a positiootl

was not asserted in the lower court and the record on apV
clearly demonstrates that the appellant was notified of
actions in the lower court and was allowrd to appear

a

a~

The res;

in all
in by
the
lower
court.
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appella~

standing and obviously the lower court felt that the appellant
had a right to be present, to present evidence and to maintain
his claim.

The very fact that the claims of the appellant

were given classification by the court supports the lower
court's belief that the appellant had standings before it.
The respondent claims that placing the appellant's claim
in third classification indicated a complete rejection of his
claim.

There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate any

such position.

In fact the respondent does not even attempt

to support the contention by any reference to the transcript
or record.

This is because he knows there is no evidence to

support such a position.
As indicated in the appellant's Statement of Facts on
pages 4 and 5 of the appellant's Brief, Cache Valley Syndicate
Trust has filed a lawsuit against the appellant for $92,000,
and the appellant has filed a Counterclaim for approximately
$100,000.

That case is pending trial at this time.

There

has never been a motion filed asking that the appellant's
Counterclaim be dismissed because of any previous court orders.
The respondent has not raised this issue in any lower court
and he should not be able to raise it for the first time on
appeal.
Even if this court were to rule that the respondent may
raise this issue on appeal, it is clear that the documents
attached as Appendix A, B and C establish the position of the
The court order, Appendix A, and the probation
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.agreement, Appendix C. state that Elmer G. Ericson is to
assign any beneficial interest he has in Cache Valley Sync1
cate Trust to individuals who have suffered a loss by reasc
of his activities.

The probation agreement is explicit tha

this refers to beneficial interest units and not to claims
that he may have as a creditor.
to comply with the order.

The appellant fully intenc

However, he can not comply with

that order unless he takes reasonable efforts to protect u
interest represented by his beneficial shares.

It is o~k.

that the court order expects him to preserve these claims

t

the best of his ability so that he can assign some of the
interest to those individuals that have suffered this loss.
If the appellant does not comply with the probation agreerro
the court may find him guilty of a probation violation.
However, his compliance or non-complaince with the probati(
agreement should not effect the case now pending before th.
court.
It should be noted that there were three criminal act
filed against Elmer Erickson in Cache County.

They were

entitled "State of Utah vs. Elmer Erickson" File Nos. 1B1L
18712 and 23004.

Elmer Erickson was never charged with ta·

money from Cache Valley Syndicate Trust, the respondents

r.-

Each one of the criminal actions related to obtaining mane
from individuals.

It was these individuals that the court

wanted to portect with its order.

It was not Cache Valle·

The respondent's statement that hundred·
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activities is totally unsupported by any evidence whatsoever,
as are the majority of the other allegations made by the
respondent in his Brief.
POINT TWO
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY BONNIE
ERICKSON'S CLAIM BEING PLACED IN CLASS
THREE.
The transcript which is part of the file contains the
proceedings of two separate hearings.
on the 12th day of April, 1977.

The first hearing was

That hearing is covered in

the transcript from page 1 through page 89.

The second

hearing was on May 23, 1977, and is contained in the transcript from page 90 through page 106.

On April 12, 1977,

the court indicated that within thirty (30) days the parties
should file motions \vith "memorandums or affidavits."

(R. 312)

Thereafter, on May 23, 1977, Robert V. Phillips, one of the
attorneys for the appellant, asked the court what actions
would be taken concerning certainty of the claims.

Judge

Christoffersen stated that there would be a further evidentiary
hearing on the issues that were contested.

(T. 105)

One of

those issues was the question of whether or not Bonnie Erickson's
claim would be placed in class three.

The attorneys

for

the

respondent had earlier conceded that her claim should not be
treated the same as Elmer Erickson's.

(T. 73)

No such

further evidentiary hearing was held.

Consequently, it is

a contention of the appellant, Bonnie Erickson, that the court
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was ever produced by the respondent indicating that she hac
any involvement in mismanagement of the trust property.
The respondent sites 9 Am Jur 2d, Bankruptcy, Section
572 Page 441 apparently in support of his position that it_
Bonnie Erickson's burden to prove

she was not involved in

any mismanagement of trust funds.

That section does not

establish that principal, but in fact states that a married
woman should not be treated any different than any oilier
creditor by reason of her marital relationship.

Counsel

does not site any authority for the position that it is
Bonnie Erickson's burden to prove
mismanagement.

she was not involved in

It would seem apparant

that this is a

burden borne by the trust if they intend to relegate her
to an inferior position to that of other beneficial interesholders.

The respondent does not claim that Bonnie Ericksc·

did not file a claim with the trust or that it was not time
Consequently, it is the position of the respondent that Bor:
Erickson must be treated the same as all other beneficial
interest holders who have not been involved in mismanageme:
of trust funds.
POINT THREE
THE LOWER COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO
ESTABLISH A PRIORITY BASED UPON AN
ALLEGED COMMON LAW ASSIGNMENT FOR THE
BENEFIT OF CREDITORS CREA7ED ON
NOVEMBER 1, 1971.
avo '-d the terms of the

respondent
attempts
toby the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. The
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that in fact said Declaration of Trust was a common law
assignment for the benefit of creditors.

The resondent

is the only one to ever raise the issue of a common law
assignment.

The Declaration of Trust which is set out in

its entirity in the recor~ pages 11 through 14,and which
is cited extensively in the appellant's Statement of Facts
does not claim to be a common law assignment for the benefit
of creditors.

The introduction paragraph of that Declaration

of Trust states in part "that we ... entered into an agreement
to create a trust ... to operate a specific investment as hereinafter explained by this statement."

Paragraph two of that

Declaration of Trust states in part" ... it is understood
and agreed that we ... being entitled to the equitable and
beneficial interest of all profits and property ... " (emphasis
added) .
It is clear from the Declaration of Trust that those
individuals agreeing to be subscribers to said document
intended that the business be operated in such a manner to be
profitable.

In fact paragraph 13 of said trust states "That

this trust shall continue for such

time as the business

proves to be profitable, but may be terminated sooner by the
trustee if he finds it desireable to do so for the best
ir.terest of the estate and Cestuis que trustents.

This trust

shall terminate twenty-one (21) years after the death of the
last subscriber of this declaration unless sooner terminated
by the trustee."

It is clear that the trust was created for

· proper t Y and other securities
the purpose of dealing 1n
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1

for the benefit of the beneficial interest holders.

The

assignment of trust was not for the purpose of 1 iquidatinc;
the assets or distributing the proceeds to the creditors

0,

beneficial interest holders.
The purpose of an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, whether at common law or by statute is to liquid,

the assets and distribute them to the creditors and other
parties having an interest or claim.

This was not the

purpose of the assignment of trust, nor was this done by
trustee established by the assignment of trust.

t~.

The respon.

attempts to classify the assignment of trust as a common !a.
assignment for the benefits of creditors because he realiZe'
that this is the only possible way

he can justify the dis:

but ion which he asks this court to accept.

The appellant

opposes that distribution because the trustee of the assigr.ment of trust created in 1971 continued to do business and
incurred indebtednesses and obligations with new creditors
while trying to operate the trust at a profit.
so,

Having ~M

said creditors are entitled to priority in their clairs

over and above the beneficial interest holders who signed r
assignment of trust and agreed to engage in the business.
The beneficial interest holders and other creditors ic
existence in 1971 could have elected to proceed with an
assignment for the bene f ~· t o f ere d ~· t ors.

l!owever, when the

did not do so but rather elected to make the trust a profi·
business, they thereby became obligated to see that the cr•
ditors dealing Hith suid trust Here first rayed before a~,
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8

proceeds were distributed to the beneficial interest
holders.
The respondent cites Utah Assn. of Credit Men v. Connell
as supporting its position that the 1971 assignment of trust
was really an assignment for the benefit of creditors.

That

case does acknowledge that a common law assignment for creditors
can be created even though Utah has a statute regulating such
assignments.

However, that case establishes that certain

formalities must be observed.

The assignment in that case was

a general assignment without preference for the benefit of all
creditors.

All creditors were notified and apparently

acquiesced or accepted the assignment.

The court stated in

part " ... It is not our purpose nor do we wish to be understood
as here deciding that in a proper case under the Utah statute
creditors may not complain of the failure to comply with
statutory formalities and procedure; but what we do now
decide is that the case at bar presents in all its phases a
valid assignment .... "

Absolutely no evidence was produced

in the lower court to demonstrate that the November 1971
assignment of trust was intended to be an assignment for the
benefit of creditors or that it complied with any of the
formalities and procedures necessary to create a valid
assignment for the benefit of creditors.
The respondent in his Brief alleges many reasons why
the court accepted the priority proposed by the trustee.
However, it should be noted that none of these allegations
arc supported by references to the transcript or record.
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The record from the lower court does not give any reason
for the priority established by the court.

CONCLUSIONS
The allegations of the respondent in his Brief are
unsupported by the record and the transcript of the court
below and contrary to the provisions of the assignment of
trust.

Consequently, the position of the respondent shoulc

be rejected and the relief prayed for by the appellant
granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBHITTED this

BY

day of September, 191

=R~o=B~E=R~T~A-.~E~CwH~A~R~D~--------

Attorney for Appellant

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoin:
Reply Brief of Appellant to David R. Daines, N. George Dair
III, Attorneys for Respond ent, 128 North Main Street, Loga:
Utah, 84321 this

day of September, 1978.
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